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Abstract: 
The study calculates nominal and effective rates of protection and their 
association with major characteristics of industries—labour intensity, export 
orientation and revealed comparative advantage. The results indicate that nominal as 
well as effective rate of protection has declined between two benchmark years—1990 
and 2002, but vegetable oil, motor vehicles, and a sector producing intermediate good 
‘other manufacturing’ remains highly protected. Overall results reveal that 
manufacturing import competing sectors enjoy higher protection through trade 
policy—tariff while negative effective rate of protection for majority of agriculture and 
services sectors show their disadvantage position in the economy. The results clearly 
indicate government priority for manufacturing sector over agriculture and services 
sectors. The results also reveal that effective rate of protection is negatively associated 
with industrial characteristics such as labour intensity, export orientation, and 
revealed comparative advantage indicating that a sector needs less protection if it has 
comparative advantage—labour intensive and produce exportable commodity. The 
results of the study also indicate that trade policy in Pakistan shifts trade in favours of 
trade in intermediate inputs in 2002 from trade in final goods in 1990. There is a need 
to restructure tariff structure to remove bias against agriculture and services sectors. 
Agriculture where majority of unskilled labour engaged ask immediate action from 
government to improve the condition of poor. 
 
Keywords: Protection, Trade Policy 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since independence, manufacturing industries of Pakistan were 
highly protected through tariff and non-tariff barriers that promoted 
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dualism1. In 1981, Pakistan move towards free trade regime by reducing 
quantitative restrictions and tariff rationalization that work through 
domestic prices and change terms of trade. Trade policy not only 
determines level of export, import, and size of the economy but also 
determines structure of consumption and production.2 Restrictive trade 
policies distort market signals of prices—imposition of tariff raises price 
by the amount of tariff. This distortion pulls factors of production 
towards protected sectors.3 Consequently, it changes structure of pro-
duction in favour of protected sectors at the cost of production in 
unprotected sectors. Therefore, protectionist policies favour import 
competing sectors at the cost of sectors having comparative advantage 
and producing exportable surplus. In brief, the effects of trade policies 
on domestic prices determine the structure of protection—nominal or 
effective—of any country, which ultimately determines structure of 
production, consumption and trade.  
Nominal protection is protection provided to final product—
tariff4 on imports. Increase in nominal protection affects consumers by 
reducing their command over goods and services – as real income 
declines. It affects producer positively by increasing their profit margin 
and hurts them by increasing cost of production. Nominal protection 
ignores cost raising effects of tariff on their inputs. For effective trade 
policy framework, effective protection is more important. It takes into 
account both protection provided to inputs (tax on production) and 
protection to final output (subsidy to production). In this paper we focus 
                                                 
1 Dualism is associated with trade policy. It is a sign of markets working poorly (or 
market failure case) for deviating from free trade. Import substitution policies promoted 
economic dualism. 
2 However, the growth impact of these policies depends on a number of other factors 
such as viability of export sectors, size of domestic market, and ability to transfer 
resources from one industry to the other. 
3 Thus protectionist policies are associated with various types of cost such as resource 
misallocation and higher cost of production, slower rate of productivity increase, loss 
of economies of scale, terms of trade losses. This may also result in reduction in 
competition and inability to take technological advantage as producers engaged in rent 
seeking activities. These are very important factors which can be focused in future 
research. 
4 In addition to tariff, any other quantitative restriction such as quota, licensing 
requirement, prohibitive measure, subsidies, or tax rebates, or imports by specific 
importers which protect domestic industry and affect prices to deviate from 
international prices, determine structure of nominal protection.  
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on both aspects of protection. Kemal (1987) recommends that for a 
policy point of view one should calculate ERPs for more than one year 
and mean value of these ERP can be used for policy point of view. This 
study is a first step in this direction. We measure nominal and effective 
protection provided through trade policies in two years 1990 and 2002 
using similar methodology, data set, and aggregation scheme to have 
comparable values. The focus of this research is to determine the 
structure of protection and associate those with the other characteristic 
of industries to identify industries need immediate action.  
First, the study investigates nature and structure of nominal and 
effective rates of protection, which measure distortions introduced in the 
economy through trade policies in 1990 and 2002 and compare them 
with the results of the earlier studies. Second, we associate structure of 
protection with other characteristics of industries such as export 
orientation, revealed comparative advantage, and factor intensity which 
is not frequently done in conventional trade policy analysis. The paper 
then briefly discusses change in investment, value added and trade over 
two benchmark years. 
In the past, a number of studies5 estimated effective rates of 
protection (ERPs) for manufacturing industry of Pakistan. However, 
these studies focus on manufacturing industries and ignore agriculture 
and services sectors. The output of agriculture and services sectors may 
not or marginally be affected directly through tariff on their output, but 
may be affected more through intermediate inputs. The importance of 
these sectors is in their connectivity with manufacturing industries- a 
sector with strong connectivity with rest of the world through trade. 
Agriculture crop sectors provide raw material to industries producing 
exportable commodities—‘energy’ and ‘transport and telecommunicat-
ion’ are major input from services sectors to industries. Therefore, we 
have included agriculture and services sectors in the analysis to present 
a comprehensive picture of structure of protection for Pakistan’s 
economy to demonstrate where action is needed.  
We calculate nominal and effective rates of protection using 
consistent data set from social accounting matrix for two years, 1990 and 
                                                 
5 Soligo and Stern (1963/4), Lewis and Guisinger (1968), Kemal (1987),  Kemal, et al. 
(1994),  Din, et al. (2007) 
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2002, for 30 sectors of the economy under three major groups – 
Agriculture (9), Industry (14), Services (7) and compare them to see the 
change in structure of protection provided through trade policy. The two 
questions are generally asked when exploring the structure of protection 
of any country: (1) ‘how much protection is given’; and (2) ‘how much 
income change as a result’. In the literature, the first question has been 
analyzed with reference to difference in domestic and world prices which 
takes into accounts both tariff rate on its competitive imports and tariff 
paid on its intermediate inputs (new concept) (Anderson, 1995). Answer 
to the second question is associated with answer to the first question i.e., 
percentage change in value added due to one unit change in tariff (old 
concept). In this paper, first we calculate protection focusing on the first 
question. The results explain the change in distortion structure 
introduced by government through tariff in an open economy in two 
benchmark years, 1990 and 2002.  
The paper is structured in four sections: introductory section is 
followed by a brief discussion on data and methodology in sections II 
and III, respectively. Section IV first part briefly discusses the structure 
of protection provided through trade policy—tariff6 in two benchmark 
years. Second part of section IV discusses key findings focusing on the 
change in structure of protection in terms of NRPs and ERPs and their 
association with sectoral characteristics and compare results with earlier 
studies. The final section concludes with a summary of key results and 
suggestions for future research. Appendix I, II and III are on details on 
industries, ranking of industries, and review of literature concerning 
theoretical aspects and empirical results, respectively.    
 
2. DATA 
 
We construct two consistent I/O matrices with the help of two 
social accounting matrices (SAM) –SAM -1990 [Siddiqui and Iqbal 
(1999)], SAM-2002 [Dorosh, et al. (2006)], and I/O table-1990 [Pakistan 
(1996)]. Motor vehicle is very important sector to be analyzed as it 
enjoys very high protection level in both period; 1990 and 2002. But data 
                                                 
6 In this paper, we assume tariff is the only restriction on imports.  
  Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection                               5 
 
for motor vehicle7 was neither available from SAM-2002 nor from I/O 
table for 1989-90. It is extracted from the aggregate data in SAM using 
information from statistical year book [Pakistan (1995), (2005)], Census 
of Manufacturing industries (CMI) [Pakistan (1990), (2001)], and CBR-
year book (1992, 2003). Incorporating this information, we construct I/O 
table with same classification for thirty sectors including motor vehicles 
classified under three major heads, agriculture (9), industry (14) and 
services (7). Details about industries (agriculture, industry and services) 
are given in Table 1 in Appendix 1.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
In the literature8, protection provided to an industry or commod-
ity has been analyzed with reference to difference in domestic and world 
prices. In this paper, nominal protection is measured by difference in 
domestic and world prices due to tariff.9 Nominal rate of protection 
(tm)10 is defined as follows: 
 
NRP (tm) = Total tariff revenue/total imports 
 
Let domestic price of a traded good be Pmi in the absence of tariff. 
Government imposes tariff on imports of good i. assuming there is no 
qualitative or quantitative restriction but tariff, price of imported item 
can be defined as follows: 
 
    wimimi PtP *)1(                                    … (1) 
                                                 
7 Demand for cars increased significantly due to banks’ consumer financing schemes 
despite high tariffs. Therefore, we incorporate this sector explicitly in the analysis. 
8  A brief review of theoretical aspects of ERP and empirical estimates for Pakistan and 
for some other countries in historical perspective are briefly discussed in Appendix III. 
9 Quantitative restrictions such as licensing requirement, prohibitive measure, 
subsidies, or tax rebates can also be included. The nominal protection provided to an 
industry can also be defined as a percentage change in domestic prices of final goods 
due to government policies. 
10 There are two ways of calculating NRPs (i) With total imports; and (ii) With imports 
(duty pay able). Here, we calculate NRPs, with total imports. 
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where, Pwi stands for world price of i
th traded good and tmi is tariff rate 
on ith commodity. Nominal protection is measured by tmi – the difference 
between domestic price and world prices due to tariff. 
 
           wiwimimi PPPt /)(                                                    … (2) 
 
ERP takes into accounts both tariff rate on its competitive 
imports and tariff paid on its intermediate inputs. Effective rate of 
protection measures protection after taking into account both tariff on 
inputs and outputs. Ideally effective rate of protection should be 
calculated in general equilibrium frame work. However, they can be 
calculated with-out solving general equilibrium model. The conditions 
are those of non-substitution theorem11and small open economy. Under 
these conditions, structure of protection depends on input-output 
relationship, and structure of taxes (nominal protection rates). We 
calculate effective rate of protection assuming non-substitution, 
separable production function, small open economy, and protection to 
industries provided through tariffs only, perfect substitutability between 
domestically produced goods and imported goods.12 Intermediate inputs 
are used in fixed coefficients (aij) (Leontief technology), the effective 
rate of protection of sector i, is measured as follows: 
 
  1
*
*)1()1(






j
ijwjwi
j
ijjwiiwi
i
aPP
atPtP
ERP                      … (3) 
Here, we assume non-traded inputs as traded inputs without tariff 
as discussed by Lewis and Guisinger (971). Another reason to include 
non-traded sector in the analysis is that they may not be protected being 
non traded sector but they are protected indirectly by using traded input.  
                                                 
11 If production is governed by constant returns to scale, there are no joint products and 
there is only one non produced factor—factor of production, then the non-substitution 
theorem tells us that the mix of production –value added – is determined by prices 
alone.  
12 However, in future, these assumptions can be dropped one by one to see the effects 
of non-tariff barriers (quota restrictions, value ceiling on imports, imports by specific 
importers, etc.) and substitutability.    
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We explore relationship of ERPs and NRPs along with other 
characteristics of industries such as labour intensity, export orientation 
and revealed comparative advantage through correlation coefficient mat-
rix to show the strength of interdependence among them. 
Labour intensity (Lint) of the ith sector is measured by the ratio of 
labour cost (L) to value added (Y).  
 
                 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑡 =
𝐿𝑖
𝑌𝑖                                                          
⁄                           … (4) 
 
Exports’ orientation (Xorti) of the ith sector is determined by export (X) to 
output ratio (Q)  
 
        𝑋𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖 𝑄𝑖⁄                                                             … (5) 
                       
and revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of the ith sector  is defined  
by the following ratio 
 
      𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑖 = (𝑋𝑖 −𝑀𝑖)/(𝑋𝑖 +𝑀𝑖)                                     … (6) 
 
where,  M stands for imports. 
This analysis along with change in investment behaviour, 
structure of production and trade would reveal the effects of incentive 
structure between two bench mark years 1990-2002 and future policy 
action.    
 
4. RESULTS 
 
(i) Trade Policy  
 
Pakistan’s trade regime can be identified as a highly complex 
structure with many different tariff rates and high degree of dispersion. 
Figure 1 shows that there is a huge gap between minimum (0%) and 
maximum (435%) tariff rates in 1990.  These values change to minimum 
(0%) and maximum (30%) excluding commodities with specific rates, in 
2002.  However, majority of imports face tariffs rates in a range 0—20% 
in both years except imports with specific rates. The imports with 
specific duty rates hold the largest share in total imports in both years 
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(see, Figure 1). Figure 1 indicates that distribution of imports in both 
periods is heavily concentrated towards specific duty rates, which cannot 
be defined by any of the tariff lines described above. 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Tariff Rates 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for tariff rates for the two 
bench mark years – 1990 and 2002. It indicates that average tariff rate 
was very high in 1990; 95.7% which reduces to 16.3% in 2002. The 
coefficient of variation13 indicates that the dispersion of tariff rates has 
reduced from 1.2 percent in 1990 to 0.8 per cent in 2002. This is also 
evident from number of duty slabs, which reduces from 14 to 4, 
indicating high level of distortions in 1990.  
Another important feature which can be observed from empirical 
data is that Pakistan was growing at faster pace under umbrella of 
                                                 
13 (SD/͞X), where SD stands for standard deviation and ͞X is mean value of tariff. 
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Figure 1: distribution of Import Tariff Rates and Imports Share (%)
1990
2002
Descriptive Statistics     1990 2002 
Mean 95.7 16.3 
Standard Error 31.4 5.5 
Coefficient of Variation 1.23 0.8 
Range 435.0 25.0 
Minimum 0.0 0.0 
Maximum 435.0 30.0 
Count(Tariff slabs) 14.0 4.0 
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protectionist policies than the policies emphasizing on free market eco-
nomy. Figure 2 shows high growth in 1960 but decline in the 1970s (a 
period after separation of East Pakistan). During 1970-1980 growth 
accelerated but decelerated after the peak point of the 1980s, when 
government started to implement trade liberalization policies by redu-
cing quantitative restrictions and tariff rationalization in the following 
years (Figure 2). This raises an important question; why are we empha-
sizing on free market economy?14 
 
 
 
Although effective protection is important for effective policy 
frame work, the importance of nominal protection cannot be ignored 
either. It is nominal protection which determines effective protection 
along with input-output relationship determined by coefficient aij. 
Effective protection is higher for the good where nominal protection is 
high on final goods along with low nominal protection on intermediate 
good. While ERP is low or turns into negative if tariff is low on final 
goods relative to tariff on input and high on intermediate input than on 
output, respectively. Therefore, ERPs and Tariff are correlated. Table 1 
                                                 
14 It is mentioned by Chen that the developing world grew at the rate of 3.1% per annum 
during the 1960-1980 period (a period characterised by protected trade regime), 
between 1980-2000 (trade liberalization), as the IMF and WTO forced more and more 
developing countries to open their economies to international competitors, their growth 
rate slumped to 1.4% per annum.  
 
Figure 2: Growth rate under protectionist and Free Market policies
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explains ERP’s dependence on tariff on input, tariff on output and free 
trade input share (see, Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Tariff and Effective Rates of Protection 
Tariff Direction of change in ERP 
If     tj  = ti  ERP= ti  = tj 
If     tj  > ti  ERP > ti  > tj 
If     tj  < ti  ERP < ti  < tj 
If     tj  < aij  * ti  ERP  < 0 
If value of imported inputs exceeds the 
value of output (at free trade prices) 
 aij > 1 =>  VA< 0 15 
 
(ii)  Nominal Rate of Protection (NRPs) 
 
Nominal Rate of protection computed using equation 1 are 
reported in Table 3. Economic-wide average tariff rate was 22.4% in 
1990, which reduced to 4.7% in 2002. This indicates significant decline 
in nominal protection under import liberalization policies implemented 
in two bench mark years—1990 and 2002. A comparison of the 
protection across the industries reveals that on average, agriculture has 
much lower NRPs than those of manufacturing in both years. The highest 
incidence of tariff within the agriculture is on ‘fishing’ sector followed 
by ‘forestry’ and ‘vegetables and fruits’. The range was very large for 
agriculture in 1990, 0 to 75%, which reduces to 0-27% in 2002. 
However, average nominal protection to agriculture sector increases 
from 6.9 percent in 1990 to 11.8 percent in 2002. Consequently, imports 
share of agriculture commodities register a decline—from 6.34 percent 
in 1990 to 3.07 percent in 2002. This is an indication of prohibitive 
tariffs. However, large variations of NRPs across agriculture sectors do 
not necessarily mean high degree of distortions in domestic relative 
prices as the share of imports of these agriculture groups of commodities 
is very small (Table 3).  
In other words, these sectors have apparent comparative 
advantage and nominal protection does not change the relative prices and 
                                                 
15 Negative values of ERP indicate that an activity may not be beneficial despite tariff 
on final output. The industries producing exportable face problem because there may 
be tariff on their inputs but they are protected by tariff on their final output.    
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consequently do not change consumer’s and producer’s behaviour.  
Thus, nominal protection does not benefit to agriculture producing expo- 
 
Table 3. Nominal Rate of Protection 
Sector 
1990 2002 1990 2002 
Imports Share NRP 
Wheat 4.30 0.29 0.0 0.0 
Rice 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Cotton 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Sugar cane 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Other major crops 0.89 0.59 6.9 0.0 
Fruit and Vegetable 0.61 1.29 36.7 27.0 
Live Stock 0.31 0.68 3.8 2.1 
Forestry 0.23 0.23 60.1 0.0 
Fishing 0.00 0.00 75.2 0.0 
Agriculture 6.34 3.07 6.9 11.8 
Mining 7.84 9.11 2.8 0.1 
Vegetable oil 3.81 2.29 30.6 44.2 
Milled Grain 0.19 0.80 0.0 0.0 
Sugar 1.01 0.27 21.7 0.0 
other food 3.52 1.04 24.0 9.4 
Lint Yarn 0.97 0.69 13.2 0.0 
Textile 0.74 1.58 43.4 13.7 
Leather 0.17 0.11 16.3 4.2 
Wood 1.76 0.55 34.8 0.0 
Chemicals 14.22 10.94 26.0 7.1 
Petroleum 5.95 9.52 12.2 2.4 
Motor Vehicles  2.24 1.93 86.4 28.8 
Other manufacturing  45.15 52.96 28.1 2.6 
Cement 0.05 0.00 27.9 0 
Manufacturing 87.60 91.79 25.7 4.7 
Energy 0.05 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Construction 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Commerce 2.60 0.21 0.0 0.0 
Transport and Communication 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Housing 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Public services 0.00 4.93 0.0 0.0 
Private services 5.64 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Services 8.29 5.14 0.0 0.0 
Total 100 100 22.4 4.7 
 
rtable, In response to a decline in nominal protection to ‘forestry’ and 
‘fishing’, imports of these two commodities did not increase rather 
import of fishing has declined. This indicates that protection through 
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tariff provided to these two commodities was redundant. 16 Pakistan has 
comparative advantage in these two commodities. While, decline in tariff 
from 36 percent to 27 percent and 3.8 to 2.1 percent on import of 
‘vegetable and fruit’ and “Live Stock” between 1990 and 2002, boost 
their imports. Import share of these two commodities doubled between 
the years under consideration; from 0.61 percent to 1.29 percent and 
00.31 to 0.68 percent. This indicates that these sectors face prohibitive 
tariff, which is detrimental for welfare of people especially in rural area. 
However, the share of these two commodities is very small in total 
imports. These are perishable commodities, Government has restricted 
imports through tariff to avoid losses.  Tariff on final good has power to 
protect the producer but it hurts the consumer. Net impact determines 
suitability of a policy for the economy as a whole. Siddiqui (2008), 
taking into account both consumer and producers sides of the economy, 
analyzes the effect of liberalization of agriculture trade. The results show 
that reduction in tariff on horticulture improves condition of poor 
population especially in rural area. Government should reduce tariff on 
these two commodities to improve condition of the poor. 
Majority of exports from Pakistan are agro-based – ‘textile’, 
‘milled grain’ (rice) and ‘leather’. First four agriculture sectors can 
broadly be classified as major input providers to these manufacturing 
sectors. For instance, ‘Wheat’, ‘Rice’, and ‘Other major crops’ provide 
inputs to ‘milled grain’, ‘Other food’, sugar cane to ‘sugar’ and ‘cotton’ 
to ‘textile’, livestock to ‘leather’. Among these sectors, ‘Textile’ produ-
cts are major export from Pakistan. Milled grain includes rice, the second 
largest export from Pakistan. Tariff on these commodities expected to 
hurt export oriented industries by raising the cost of production. In both 
years, these sectors are not protected by tariff. Hence, the cost of 
production did not increase. The sectors producing exportable remains 
competitive.   
In agriculture, variation in tariff rates for manufacturing indus-
tries is also large. Industry consists of both import competing and export 
                                                 
16 The benefit of protection also depends on the selection of market where producers 
wants to sell their product. For instance, producers of exportable commodities may 
enjoy higher protection if producing for domestic market in presence of tariff on import 
of these commodities and sell them in domestic market for higher return.  
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oriented sectors as 91% of imports and 87% of exports are industrial 
based. Table 3 indicates that some industrial sectors have large imports 
inflows despite high tariff. This observation indicates that government 
tends to raise tariff revenue albeit providing protection to domestic 
producers. But there is high risk that protection to industries tends to 
misallocate limited resources. Table 3 reveals that on average NRPs on 
industries has declined substantially between 1990 and 2002, i.e., from 
25.7% to 4.7%. Consumer goods industries such as sugar, other food 
items, textile has very high NRPs in 1990s, which have declined 
substantially from the range of 22— 43 percent to 9.4—13.4 percent. But 
nominal protection to vegetable oil industry has increased from 30.6% 
to 44%. High protection given to final consumer goods means that high 
costs borne by consumers. In 1990, sector producing exportable surplus 
‘Textile' was highly protected as tariff was higher than average; 43.4 
percent. In 2002, government reduced tariff on it to 13.7 percent. In 
response to a significant decline in nominal protection, imports share of 
textile marginally increased between two bench mark years. This 
indicates that tariff on textile is redundant and sector has comparative 
advantage.17 Government put tariff on its imports for revenue generation 
purposes only. Despite the fact that imports of milled grain did not face 
any tariff, imports share remains less than one per cent—0.2 and 0.8 
percent in 1990 and 2002, respectively. This indicates the sector’s 
comparative advantage. The other two sectors producing consumer 
goods are ‘sugar’ and ‘other food’. Their import shares in the total import 
have declined between 1990 and 2002, despite significant decline in 
tariff over the same period.  
Among the import competing manufacturing sectors, motor 
vehicle is highly protected sector in both years but nominal protection 
has significantly declined in 2002 (one third of the level in 1990). Its 
import share remained around 2%. During this period, banks consumer 
financing schemes boost demand for domestically produced cars. Within 
the manufacturing sector, the largest import share is of ‘other manufac-
turing’ producing intermediate goods which includes electric machinery, 
non-electric machinery, transport equipment excluding motor vehicles, 
                                                 
17 Export oriented industry ‘Textile’ receive very large subsidies from government in 
both periods, which neutralize the impact of tariff. 
14                                                  Haque and Siddiqui  
 
 
etc. Despite highly protected sectors with tariff rate (nominal protection) 
of 28%, imports inflow of other manufacturing goods is 45% of the total 
in 1990. Government significantly liberalizes this sector by reducing 
nominal protection to 2.6%. Consequently imports share has increased 
from 45% to 53%. In rest of the industrial sectors producing intermediate 
inputs such as chemical, petroleum which has strong backward linkages 
with rest of the economy and cement with construction industry, nominal 
rate of protection has declined substantially (see, Table 3).  The effects 
of reduction in tariff vary by commodity.  Import of petroleum increased 
which indicates that tariff is binding on its imports. Therefore, imports 
two commodities, i.e., ‘chemicals’ and ‘cement’, have declined over 
time. The demand for their import fell. The reason can be slowdown in 
economic activity or because of substitution of domestically produced 
goods. These sectors may have become competitive over time.  The 
reasons of this decline need to be explored further. 
Despite no tariff on import of services, the share of services 
sectors in total imports declined from 8.29 percent in 1990 to 5.14 
percent in 2002. Effective rates of protection reveal the reasons behind 
this decline.    
 
(iii) Effective Rates of Protection (ERPs)  
 
ERPs reflect protection the industries receive from government 
through trade policies—tariff on both input and output. This section 
compares effective rates of protection across the sectors as well as over 
the two bench mark years—1990 and 2002.  
           We compute ERPs for 30 sectors of the economy assuming no 
barrier on imports exist in the economy but tariff.18 A positive ERP 
indicates that value added is higher than it would be in the absence of the 
government intervention.19 The opposite effects of tariff on output and 
inputs may result in negative effective rate of protection while NRP is 
                                                 
18 The results may understate actual protection enjoyed by the industries in presence of 
non-tariff barriers on trade. 
19 In presence of any other protective measure(other than tariff), value added increase 
by tariff equivalent—over all difference between world and domestic prices.  
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still positive. Negative ERPs reveals sectors’ disadvantage position 
under existing policies. The results are reported in Table 4.           
The economy shows a decline in protection level between 1990 
and 2002 (a period characterized by tariff rationalization), i.e., from 
42.5% to 27.4% [Table 4]. ERPs by economic classification reveals 
discrimination against primary sectors (agriculture) and services sectors. 
On average ERPs for the agriculture and manufacturing industry has 
declined but services position has improved. The results also reveal that 
most of effective protection comes from high tariff on final output with 
low tariff on their imported input or using locally produced inputs.  
In agriculture, ERPs have declined moderately, by 4 percentage 
points. Crop sectors have been negatively protected, though negative 
protection in absolute term has reduced in 2002. Negative effective 
protection rate for crops indicate inputs to these sectors are highly 
protected—chemical (fertilizer) (see, Table 4). Negative rates of 
protection have reduced (in absolute term) in 2002, the improvement in 
crop sectors comes from input channel, tariff on chemicals (fertilizer) 
has been reduced from 26 percent in 1990 to 7.1 percent in 2002. On the 
one hand, this change in tariff structure increases their prices and brings 
them closer to world prices. On the other hand, it increases cost of 
production of the exportable commodities of manufacturing sectors, 
where these commodities are major inputs. Commodities such as – 
‘forestry’ and ‘fishing’ are highly protected in 1990, but protection on 
these two sectors has significantly reduced in 2002 due to tariff 
elimination on final good of ‘fishery’ and ‘forestry’ and turn into 
negative (see, Table 4). These are the sectors where ERP if greater than 
NRP, therefore enjoyed the higher benefits in 1990. ‘Vegetables and 
Fruit’ (perishable commodities) remains highly protected in both years 
[see, Table 3], though effective protection has marginally declined from 
42.3 percent in 1990 to 40.5 percent in 2002 but remains higher than 
NPR. Thus, the producer of these commodities reaps high benefits than 
any other agriculture sector.  
The sectors are arranged by level of protection in Appendix II-
Table 1. A clear pattern of ranking of industries emerges. It reveals that 
ranking of majority of industries change as effective rates of protection 
change between two benchmark years, 1990 and 2002. Among agri-
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culture sectors ‘Fishing’, and ‘Fruit and Vegetable’ producing perishable 
consumer goods that are exportable are the most protected sectors in 
1990. In 2002, ‘Fruit and Vegetables’ and ‘Livestock’ are the most 
protected sectors. These are the sectors where nominal tariff was greater 
than zero. Tariff on majority of crop sectors imports is equal to zero, 
therefore they face negative protection because of tariff on their inputs 
such as fertilizers. Two staple food commodities –Wheat and Rice – used 
as intermediate goods for export oriented manufacturing industries and 
manufactured consumer goods sector take the lowest positions and have 
negative protection level. This again indicates disadvantageous position 
of agriculture sector (relative to industry) where majority of rural poor is 
engaged in earning their livelihood. Therefore, there is a need to 
formulate a policy to remove bias against agriculture and bring domestic 
price equal to world prices. Tariff on their inputs should be reduced. 
However, this will increase cost of production of exportable, where they 
are used as intermediate goods. Government should subsidize those 
sectors to neutralize the impact of increase in cost of producing 
exportable.   
The results reported in Table 4 clearly show that industrial 
sectors have been enjoying the highest protection level in both bench 
mark years despite decline in average effective rate protection for 
manufacturing sectors —from 46.6 percent to 29.3 percent. The results 
show that ‘vegetable oil’ and ‘motor vehicles’ have been highly 
protected in both years—1990 and 2002. ERPs on motor vehicles is very 
high— 302.85 percent in 1990, which has declined to 100.8 percent in 
2002. Because, NRP on ‘motor vehicles’ is very high—86.4 (28.8) per 
cent relative to nominal protection to its major input provider sector 
‘Transport equipment’ included in other manufacturing sector 28.1 (2.6) 
percent in 1990 (2002).  
The most protected sector in 2002 is vegetable oil, which is 
categorized as final consumer good, protection level has increased 
between 1990 and 2002.  This sector enjoys the maximum protection 
from government trade policies in 2002. This increase in protection is 
from two channels—(1) nominal protection to its final product has 
increased from 30.6 to 44.2 percent; and (2) nominal protection to its 
intermediate inputs from agriculture ‘fruit and vegetable’ has declined 
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from 36.7 percent to 27 percent.  
The EPR on two basic food items—‘Vegetable oil’ and ‘Other 
food’ have increased over time that benefits to the producers but harmful 
for consumers—in particular expected to hurt more to poor segment of 
population, whose larger share of budget is spent on foods commodities.  
 
Table 4. Effective Rates of Protection by Industry (%) 
Sector 
ERPs 
1990 2002 
Wheat -21.11 -2.5 
Rice -15.14 -1.6 
Cotton -17.49 -2.6 
Sugar cane -10.89 -1.4 
Other major crops 1.37 -0.5 
Fruit and Vegetable 43.24 40.5 
Live Stock -2.94 1.3 
Forestry 69.59 -0.2 
Fishing 99.69 -1.1 
Agriculture 20.9 16.9 
Mining -0.01 0.0 
Vegetable Oil 210.96 468.5 
Milled Grain -51.09 -1.2 
Sugar 42.37 -0.5 
Other food 16.91 17.1 
Lint Yarn 1.91 -1.9 
Textile 102.95 45.9 
Leather 23.57 33.3 
Wood 57.82 -0.9 
Chemicals 32.97 20.0 
Refined Petroleum 2.59 36.7 
Other manufacturing 60.35 129.9 
Motor Vehicles 302.85 100.8 
Cement 26.25 -65.0 
Manufacturing 46.6 29.3 
Energy -16.60 -0.2 
Construction -32.80 -3.7 
Commerce -1.92 -0.3 
Transport and Communication -14.74 -0.5 
Housing -4.90 -0.1 
Public services -16.74 -0.8 
Private services -12.99 -0.3 
Services -16.1 -0.8 
Total 42.5 27.4 
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Milled grain, a major food item and an export commodity, faces 
negative protection. The prices are lower than world prices, which 
benefit to consumer but deteriorating effect on producer. They produce 
less than the level they can produce. This is detrimental for growth 
prospects of the economy.   
Sugar was heavily protected in 1990. Due to reduction in tariff 
on both its inputs and output, this sector is net looser as effective 
protection level from 42.4 in 1990 turn into negative protection—(-0.5).     
The results show that export oriented industry ‘textile’ enjoys 
high protection, but imports share remains very small. Over time 
effective protection to textile has reduced because of decline in tariff on 
final good and increase in prices of cotton (major input). Producer can 
increase their profit by domestic sale. This indicates that benefit of 
protection depends on the market where producer wants to sell their 
product. The protection to ‘lint yarn’ has been reduced from 1.9 to (-1.9) 
between two years. It is operating less than its optimal level. It is 
associated with exportable. Government should pay attention to improve 
its condition.  
In addition to ‘Vegetable Oil’, two other import competing 
sectors, ‘Refined Petroleum’ and ‘other manufacturing’ enjoy high 
protection in both years and over time the protection level has increased. 
That shows that import competing sectors still enjoy high protection 
despite decline in tariff on these commodities, which is detrimental for 
efficient use of factors of production. 
 These commodities have larger backward linkages and are 
categorized as intermediate goods. Prices of these commodities are 
higher than world prices and have cost push effect in production. Cement 
– another intermediate input – was highly protected in 1990. But reduct-
ion in tariff on its imports reduces protection from high positive to 
negative. The lower price of cement benefits to construction sector by 
reducing their cost of raw material. The construction will boost its 
production, where unskilled labour from poor households is engaged.     
Leather – a sector producing exportable — enjoys high protection 
in both years. The ERP on Leather has increased from 23.6 to 33.3 per-
cent between 1990 and 2002. Its import share is small. Like textile, this 
sector enjoys the benefit of higher prices being a competitive sector in 
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the world market. It can also increase the benefit by increasing their sale 
in domestic market.  
The ranking of the industries in Table 1 Appendix I show that 
ranking of industries have changed over time. Among the manufacturing 
sectors, motor vehicle and vegetable oil takes top positions in both years. 
Overall results show, effective protection was higher for final consumer 
goods-vegetable oil and textile (basic need commodities). ‘Motor 
Vehicle’ and ‘Other Manufacturing’ commodities (classified as invest-
ment Good and intermediate goods respectively) also enjoy higher 
protection level in the 1990s. In 2002 all these four items again take first 
four positions from the top and enjoy higher protection—higher than the 
average level of protection of manufacturing industries and also higher 
than average economy-wide protection in both years. This has very 
strong implications for poverty and welfare of the people as well as for 
growth prospects.  
Industries producing intermediate goods such as chemical retain 
their positions. In relative term it still enjoys benefit of protection higher 
than six sectors of the economy. Another intermediate good, petroleum 
reaped larger benefits in 2002. This sector became more profitable in 
2002.  
Among the consumer good producing sectors ‘other food’ 
become more profitable in 2002 relative to in 1990. The ranking of 
industries shows the profitability of sectors. If investment decisions are 
made on the basis of profit margin, this gives a clear picture for priority 
sectors for investment. 
However, to some extent the results are dependent on the 
aggregation of commodities, i.e., aggregating commodities that have 
high NRPs with those that have low NRPs change the structure of 
protection. For instance ‘other manufacturing sector’ including motor 
vehicle shows NRP of 31% and 3.5% in 1990 and 2002 respectively. 
This aggregation (underestimates) the protection enjoyed by the motor 
vehicle. After disaggregating data of motor vehicles from other 
manufacturing sector reveal that motor vehicle sector remains among the 
top 3 positions in both years with NRPs/ERP 28.1/302.8 percent and 
2.6/100.8 percent in 1990 and 2002, respectively. 
Third group belongs to services sectors which are not directly 
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protected through tariffs. Negative ERPs reveal their disadvantageous 
position from input channel. Tables 2 and 3 reveal position of services 
sectors improves in 2002 as negative protection has significantly 
declined in absolute term from[-16.1 percent] in 1990 to [-0.8 percent] 
in 2002. The most negatively affected sector in both years is construct-
ion. Cement is major input to this sector, which is highly protected 
through tariff; 27.9 percent in 1990, which reduces to 0 in 2002. 
Consequently, effective protection changes from [-32.8] percent in 1990 
to [-3.7] percent in 2002. The decline in absolute value of ERPs of 
services sector indicate that tariff on intermediate input to services 
sectors has been significantly reduced. The results indicate that reduction 
in cost of production favours services sector. While this is expected to 
increase the cost of production in all other sectors of the economy 
through input channel. For example, ‘energy and transport and comm-
unication’ which have strong backward linkages, increase in their price 
increase cost of production. Though bias against services sectors has 
declined in absolute terms between 1989-90 and 2002, there is a need to 
reduce tariff on their input to neutralize negative effective protection and 
bring domestic prices closer to world prices. The sectors will bear the 
larger impact the larger the share these input have in production. Due to 
reduction in bias against services sector, investment in services sectors 
doubles in 2002 from the level in 1990. Hence, services share in GDP 
has also increased. Investment in agriculture and manufacturing 
industries has declined over the same period. 
A clear picture of structure of effective protection by sectors for 
two bench mark years is presented in Figures 4 to 6. The gap between 
the two curves shows the change in protection level between two years. 
The larger the gap between two lines the higher will be the change in 
policies over the bench mark years.   
From Figure 4, we observe that among manufacturing industries, 
large variation is in ERPs on ‘vegetable oil’ and ‘motor vehicle’, which 
are highly protected in both years. Among agriculture sectors, ‘forestry’ 
and ‘fishing’ face larger change in their protection level. While ‘Fruit 
and vegetables’ face same protection level in both years (see, Figure 5).       
The large variation is found among the services sectors. ERP 
decline significantly. The prices in these sectors are moving towards the 
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world price level or free trade prices.  
If ratio of an industry’s protection over the economy average is used, 
agriculture reaps less premium than industry. Consumers of these comm-
odities gain while their producers lose. Despite increase in NRPs on 
agriculture, effective protection has declined from 20.9% to 16.9% 
between 1990 and 2002. Average ERPs on agriculture commodities 
remains lower than in manufacturing [Table 4]. ERP for mining was 
negative in 1990s but increase marginally above zero—0.01 percent in 
2002. The industries with negative ERPs imply that these industries are 
not only unprotected but also looser by the existing trade regime.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Effective Protection by Industry 
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Figure 5. Efective Protection by Agriculture Sectors
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Absolute protection level and structure of protection affect 
resources allocation play a dominant role in forming structure of 
production, investment, and trade. Tables 2 and 3 indicate a large 
difference in incentives provided through NRPs and ERPs not only 
across the industries—agriculture, industry, and services but also within 
the industries. With such a structure of protection, investments tend to 
go away from unprotected sectors (agriculture and services) towards 
protected sector (industry). It hurts the poor segment of population as 
majority of them are engaged in agriculture activities (51 percent and 42 
percent in 1990 and 2002, respectively)20. In this sense, trade liberali-
zation is expected to be beneficial for the poor especially in rural areas 
and for women [see, Siddiqui, 2008, Siddiqui, 2009]. Results show that 
nominal as well as effective protection to industries has significantly 
declined between two bench mark years—1990 and 2002 (see, Table 5). 
While status of services sectors improves as negative protection 
to services sectors has reduced from (-16.1) to (-0.8) percent in absolute 
term. Improved conditions of services sectors can be viewed from 
investment and production side. Investment in services sectors has 
doubled from Rs.4143 million to Rs.8340 million and its value added 
share has increased from 48.7 to 52.7 percent between 1990 and 2002, 
respectively. While agriculture and industrial sectors shares have decli-
ned (see, Table 5). Agriculture and Industrial shares have declined from 
25.8 percent and 25.5 percent to 24.4 percent and 22.9 percent between 
1990 and 2002.   
                                                 
20 The number increases if one uses new definition of employed persons.  
Figure 6. Effective Protection for Services Sectors
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Structure of protection also affects structure of imports and 
exports. Between two benchmark years imports share of final goods in 
total imports has declined from 52 percent to 39 percent but imports 
share of industrial raw material for capital goods and consumer goods 
has increased from 48 to 61 percent. Like global trade, structure of 
protection shifts trade structure in favour of trade in intermediate goods 
that is an indication of industrialization in the country. Conversely, 
exports of manufactured goods (final goods) has increased from 56 
percent to 75 percent and exports of primary goods and semi-manu-
factured goods has declined from 44 percent to 25 percent. Both the 
changes in structure of imports and exports reveal that structure of 
protection in Pakistan has promoted industrialization process in the 
country. However, in depth analysis of the issue requires general 
equilibrium frame work.  
A comparison of the results of this study with the results of the earlier 
studies reveals the change in structure of protection over time. Though 
these studies differ in terms of computation method, data sets, 
aggregation schemes, and prices used. But the results, to some extent, 
can be compared in terms of direction of change and trend. Table 6 shows 
that ERP for Pakistan has declined from 271 to 66 percent between 1963-
64 and 1980-81. Over the same period, average ERP for finished goods 
and capital goods have declined but ERP for intermediate goods has 
increased from 88 to 235 percent. The results of this study show that 
both, simple average and weighted average of ERPs for manufacturing 
industries has declined from 86.5 per cent to 69.1 per cent and 46.6 
percent to 29.3 percent, respectively, over the next twelve years. Over 
the same period, ERP on finished goods has increased due to decline in 
ERP for intermediate goods from 31.9 percent to 21.5 percent.  A 
comparison of ERPs for auto industry shows that ERP increased from 
292 to 302.8 between 1963-64 and 1989-90 and has declined during the 
next twelve years to 100.8 percent. ERP for investment goods has also 
declined from 129.8 percent to 55.2 percent. The results are sensitive to 
extreme cases. If we exclude motor vehicles value from investment 
goods, average ERP reduces to 43.3 percent and to 32.45 percent in 1990 
and 2002, respectively. Therefore, these results can be used as suggestive 
not definitive.   
  
Table 5. Structure of Protection and Economy (per cent) 
  Nominal Protection Effective Protection Investment mln of Rs Value Added 
     
  1989-90 2001-02 1989-90 2001-02 1989-90 2001-02 1989-90 2001-02 
Agriculture  6.9 11.8 20.9 16.9 8832 7383. 25.8 24.4 
Industry  25.7 4.7 46.6 29.3 12184 15644 25.5 22.9 
Services  0 0 -16.1 -0.8 4143 8340 48.7 52.7 
  Import Shares by Economic Classification Export Share by Economic Classification 
  Capital Goods Raw material for Capital and 
Consumer Goods 
Consumer 
Goods 
Total Primary 
Commodities 
Semi 
Manufactured 
Manufactured Total 
1989-90  33 48 19 100 20 24 56 100 
2001-02  28 61 11 100 11 14 75 100 
 
 
 
 
 
2
4
                                       H
a
q
u
e a
n
d
 S
id
d
iq
u
i                                                    
 
Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection                                     25                                                  
 
Table 6.  Effective Rates of Protection for Manufacturing Sectors of 
Pakistan in Historical Perspective* 
 Average 1963/4 1968/9 1980/1 1989/90** 2001/02** 
Finished Goods 883 179 26 50.7 70.0 
Intermediate Goods 88 61 235 31.9 21.5 
Capital Goods 155 58 69 129.8(43.3)@ 55.2 (32.45)@ 
Motor Vehicles 292*   302.8 100.8 
All Goods 271 125 66 86.5(46.6a) 69.1(29.3a) 
Sources: Dorosh and Alberto (1990), Table 3 on pp 19.   ** Estimates for Manufacturing Industries from this 
study. @ Values in the brackets are average excluding motor vehicles.  a. Values in the brackets are weighted 
average. 
 
A comparison of the results with the results of Diakantoni and 
Hubert (2012) for ten developed and developing countries shows that the 
range of degree of protection on industries of Pakistan is broader than in 
developing countries and also broader than that in developed countries. 
Table 7 shows 25.7 percent sectors in developing countries and 8.3 per-
cent in developed countries benefit from tariff schedules in agriculture 
(where, ERP is higher than their nominal protection). In case of Pakistan, 
agriculture sectors enjoy the benefit of effective protection was 66.7 
percent in 1990 which reduced to 33.3 percent in 2002. Relative loser 
are the sectors where ERP is less than the NRP and net loser are those 
sectors where ERP is less than zero.  
In case of Pakistan, the table shows that share of agriculture 
sectors where ERP is less than NRP has remained constant over 1990-
2002, 33.3 percent. But the share of agriculture sectors facing negative 
protection has increased to 33.3 percent between 1990 and 2002. Table 
7 shows that tariff schedule not only remains biased against agriculture, 
but over time the situation has worsened. However, the results are 
sensitive to level of aggregation. The structure of protection for manu-
facturing sectors has also changed over time.21 The results show that 66.7 
percent of manufacturing industries producing final consumer goods 
enjoys the benefits of tariff schedule in 1990, which has declined to 55.6 
                                                 
21 Though results at the disaggregated (4 digit or 2 digit level on the basis of SITC) 
level may reveal the structure change within the group. 
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percent in 2002. The share of manufacturing industries where ERPs are 
less than NRP was 22.2 percent in 1990 which was eliminated in 2002. 
However, the share of manufacturing industries where ERPs are less than 
zero has increased from 11.1 percent to 44.4 percent (net looser). Table 
shows that a larger proportion of industries (both agriculture and 
industries) producing intermediate goods face negative protection in 
Pakistan compared to both in developed and developing countries i.e., 
45.5 and 63.6 percent in 1990 and 2002, respectively. While these 
number are 30.1 for developing countries and 12 percent for developed 
countries. The results are sensitive to aggregation scheme. We have 
estimated ERP at a very aggregate level. There is a need to compute ERP 
with same disaggregated schemes to get picture close to reality. 
 
(iv) Correlation between NRP, ERP and Other Characteristics of 
Industries 
 
This section explores the links between incentives for domestic 
producers with some characteristics of an industry such as labour 
intensity, export orientation and revealed comparative advantage (RCA), 
etc., by calculating correlation coefficients. 
Table 8 shows that there is a strong association between nominal 
and effective protection at the national level—0.69 at the national level, 
the relationship between NRPs/ERPs with the export orientation, levels 
of labour intensity and RCA is negative as expected. Because, in a labour 
intensive country, labour intensive sector has comparative advantage and 
those sectors needs less protection. The country exports commodities 
where it has comparative advantage and employ more abundant factor—
Labour in case of Pakistan. Similarly, if a country has comparative 
advantage in a commodity then tariff becomes redundant. This finding 
is consistent as Pakistan has comparative advantage in the sectors which 
are labour intensive.    
At the sectoral level the association between NRPs and ERPs 
decreases from agriculture to industry from 0.98 to 0.69. Although the 
association of NRP and ERP with labour intensity, export orientation and 
RCA is negative at the economy level, but results deviate at the sectoral 
level. A positive association between protection and revealed comparat-
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ive advantage and the relationship between ERP and export orientation 
in agriculture are not consistent with expectation. However, value is very 
small. Because majority of exports from Pakistan are not of agricultural 
commodities but agro based industrial exportable commodities such as 
textile and rice (milled grain). Another counter intuitive result is positive 
association between NRP and labour intensity in industry. These are few 
areas which need further research.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The study investigates nature and structure of NRPs and ERPs 
using I-O table from SAM 1990 and 2002 based on the assumption that 
only tariff barriers to imports prevails in the economy. The result shows 
that both the nominal and the effective protection vary by type of 
industries. It benefits more to manufacturing industries than agriculture 
and services sector. However, equal protection to all sectors could not be 
implemented as resource constraint may not allow to expand all sectors 
at the same time. There is a need to prioritize sectors for investment 
purposes. ERP does this very efficiently.   
The study reports a decrease in NRPs from 1990 to 2002 
reflecting the effect of lower tariff in 2002. While decrease in ERPs 
reflect the effect of both change in interconnectivity with industries 
(change in technology)22 and change in NPRs. Majority of industrial sec-
tors are highly protected by existing government trade policies in both 
years. On average, nominal as well as effective rates of protection are 
higher for industry than for agriculture. Overall results show 
manufacturing sector enjoyed the highest protection followed by agricu- 
lture. Many manufacturing industries have very high NRP and ERPs, 
particularly motor vehicle industry, which is capital intensive and 
expected to affect more to rich. The industries that produce consumer 
goods come next, which are largely protected. Producers of these 
commodities gain, while consumer lose. This is expected to hurt the poor 
segment of population more as food has larger share in their budget.
                                                 
22 Here, we assume fixed technology. 
  
Table 7. Sectors share by level of ERP Relative to NRP (%)* 
 ERP>NRP ERP<NRP ERP<0 
 Developing Developed Total Developing Developed Total Developing Developed Total All Sectors 
Agriculture 25.7 8.3 34.0 32.4 8.3 40.7 19.4 5.9 25.3 100.0 
Manufacturing 45.7 11.5 57.3 19.5 7.1 26.6 11.0 5.1 16.1 100.0 
Raw 
material 
6.6 0.0 6.6 38.3 13.1 51.4 30.1 12.0 42.1 100.0 
Total 38.9 9.9 48.8 23.3 7.9 31.2 14.1 5.9 20.0 100.0 
Pakistan 1990 2002  1990 2002  1990 2002   
Agriculture** 66.7 33.3 0 33.3 33.3 0 0 33.3 0 100 
Manufacturing** 66.7 55.6  22.2 0  11.1 44.4 0 100 
Intermediate*** 18.2 27.3  36.4 9.1  45.5 63.6  100 
* Percentage of sectors for developed and developing countries are calculated based on information in Diakantoni and Hubert (2012).  
** these include final consumer goods only . *** Intermediate goods from both agriculture and manufacturing sectors. 
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Another indirect conclusion can be drawn from the results is that 
the large gap between ERPs of agriculture, industries, and services 
disfavour agriculture and services sectors. That may widen the rural-
urban gap. Agriculture crop sectors (which provide intermediate inputs 
to export oriented industries) and services sectors suffer from negative 
protection in 1990 that significantly reduced in 2002. Agriculture non-
crop sector are highly protected but protection to these sectors are 
redundant. ERPs for these sectors overestimate the actual protection. In 
2002, government eliminated tariff on all non-crop sectors but ‘Fruit and 
Vegetable’ and ‘Live Stock’.  Except these two sectors, all agriculture 
sectors suffer from negative protection form input channel.  
The reduction in ERPs is strong among manufacturing where 
intermediate inputs suffered from negative protection (milled grain) but 
effect has reduced between 1990 and 2002. Reduction in negative values 
indicates that price of agriculture commodities move toward world price. 
This indicates increase in cost of production in the sectors where they 
are intensively used. Decline in ERPs of industrial sectors indicate trade 
policies seem to be export led in 2002.  
  In brief, trade polices seem to reduce rent seeking activities (as 
measured by ERPs) indicating more open trade regime in Pakistan in 
2002. ERP greatly reduced for ‘motor vehicles’ due to reduction in tariff 
on its imports. It is also reduced in labour intensive activity agriculture 
sectors and manufacturing ‘textile and clothing’ sector. The decrease in 
protection level for these sectors can largely be attributed to decrease in 
nominal protection on final goods, where nominal tariff was redundant. 
Government impose tariff for the sake revenue generation purposes. 
NRPs have also reduced on intermediate goods ‘Petroleum’, 
‘Chemicals’, and ‘other manufacturing’, ‘Cement’, etc. Drop in NRP on 
intermediate inputs implies drop in cost of production. The sectors which 
have stronger connectivity with these sectors benefit more. Reduction in 
tariff benefits these sectors. Review of structure of trade and production 
reveals that structure of protection in Pakistan has promoted trade in 
intermediate goods that is an indication of industrialization. This implies 
that Pakistan government has achieved the target to protect its industry 
through tariff. With the shift from trade in final goods to trade in 
intermediate good, the role of ERPs becomes more important to measure 
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protection to value added. The availability of two I/O tables allows us a 
deeper analysis of protection using trade policy and interconnectivity. 
The analysis reveals that the factors responsible for the change in 
protection level – change in structure of tariff.  
 
Table 8. Correlation Matrix (%) 
 
Correlation coefficient matrix reveals a link between effective 
protection and industry’s characteristics. At economy level, high 
correlation exists between ERP and NRP, both are negatively associated 
with labour intensity, export orientation and RCA at the national level. 
However, at the sectoral level some results are not consistent with 
expectation. We leave this area to be explored in future by researchers.  
The studies using I-O table under the assumption of separable 
production function renders unbiased results and can be used to predict 
direction of change in resource allocation, value added, and production, 
which can be used by policy makers to prioritize sectors for investment. 
The key contribution of this study is that the results of ERP for two years 
1990 and 2002 are comparable. They are based on I-O table with same 
production and tariff aggregation schemes and are computed in same 
analytical framework. However, more studies are needed to compute 
EPR with same aggregation schemes with most recent data to set up an 
effective policy framework. But on the basis of this research we 
recommend that:   
Economy NRP ERP 
ERP 0.69 1.00 
Export/Out Put -0.09 -0.08 
Labour/Value Added -0.29 -0.24 
RCA -0.01 -0.18 
Agriculture  
ERP 0.98 1.00 
Export/Out Put -0.01 0.06 
Labour/Value Added -0.38 -0.46 
RCA 0.34 0.39 
Industry   
ERP 0.69 1.00 
Export/Out Put -0.14 -0.14 
Labour/Value Added 0.23 -0.03 
RCA -0.07 -0.17 
Note: RCA= Revealed comparative Advantage 
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1. Bias against exportable should be reduced to reap more benefit 
instead of penalizing them. For instance ‘Milled grain’, contains 
‘Rice’ which is second largest export from Pakistan. It is 
negatively affected by existing tariff structure. There is a need to 
formulate a policy which brings negative ERPs values equal to 
zero to eliminate bias. Tariff on their inputs should be reduced.  
2. The sectors where larger proportion of low tariff imports are used 
as intermediate goods in production and also have higher returns 
that sector should be apriority sector for investment. See ranking 
of the industries by ERP in Appendix 2—Table 1.  
3.  It is recommended that tariff should be reduced on the sectors 
which have larger connectivity such as ‘chemicals’, ‘other 
manufacturing’ and ‘petroleum’ to foster industrialization 
process. It will benefit more sectors than any other sector.  
4. Majority of agriculture sectors are negative protected, where 
unskilled wage labour is engaged. They bear the cost of negative 
protection in terms of low wages. There is need to remove this 
bias. Reduce tariff on the inputs such as chemical—fertilizer.  
 
The spirit of ERP lies in the fact that how they affect not only 
trade and production but also other micro and macro aspects of an 
economy, i.e., consumption, welfare, poverty, etc. To quantify the effects 
on all dimensions of the economy including welfare and poverty 
simultaneously, CGE model should be used. 
  
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. 
Sectors: Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) has constructed 
Supply and Use Table for 1990 with 86 sectors. While Dorosh, et al. 
(2006) constructed SAM-2002 with 34 sectors of production. These 
sectors are classified under major head of agriculture, industry and 
services. Sectors are aggregated with same classification for two bench 
mark years, 1990 and 2002 to have comparable estimates.  The detail of 
sector aggregation is given in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Classification of Sectors* 
Noo Sectors SAM Activity Code I/O-1991 Serial 
number 
National 
Account 
Sectors 
1 Wheat irrigated A-WHTI A1a-A1b 2 Major Crops 
2 Rice A-PADI+PADB A2-A3 1 Major Crops 
3 Cotton A-COTT A4 3 Major Crops 
4 Sugar cane A-CANE A5 4 Major Crops 
5 Other major 
crops 
A-OCRP A6 5-8, 12, 13 Major Crops 
6 Fruits/vegetables A-HORT A7 9, 10, 11 Minor Crops 
7 Poultry A-CATT + Poultry A8-A9 14 Livestock 
+Poultry 
8 Forestry A-FOR A10 15 Forestry 
9 Fishing A-FISH A11 16 Fishing 
10 Mining A-MINE A12 17, 18, 19 Mining 
11 Vegetable oils A-VEGO A13 21 Manufacturing 
12 Grain Milled A-WHTF + RiceI + RiceB A14-A16 22, 23 Manufacturing 
13 Sugar A-SUG A17 24 Manufacturing 
14 Other food A-OTHF A18 25-27 Manufacturing 
15 Lint, yarn A-YARN A19 28,29 Manufacturing 
16 Textiles A-TEXT A20 30-36 Manufacturing 
17 Leather A-LEAT A21 37, 38 Manufacturing 
18 Wood A-WOOD A22 39-40 Manufacturing 
19 Chemicals A-CHEM A23 41-43 Manufacturing 
20 Cement, bricks A-CEM A24 48-49 Manufacturing 
21 Petroleum 
refining 
A-PETR A25  Manufacturing 
22 Other 
manufacturing** 
A-MANF A26 44-47, 50-60 Manufacturing 
23 Energy A-ENRG A27 61,63 (62) Electricity and 
Gas 
24 Construction A-CONS A28 64 Construction 
25 Commerce A-TRAD A29 73-74 Wholesale and 
Retail Trade 
26 Transport A-TRNS A30 76-81 Transport and 
Communic. 
27 Housing A-HSNG A31 87,88 Ownership of 
Dwell 
28 Private services A-PRISV A32 82-86, 89, 92, 94, 
96, 97 
Services, 
Finance, 
Insurance and 
Banks 
29 Public services A-PUBS A33 90 Public 
Administration 
and Defense 
* For Further details see Pakistan (1996) and Dorosh, et al. (2004). **This sector is further disaggregated into two 
sectors: ‘Motor Vehicles’ and ‘Other Manufacturing’ for both years 1990 and 2002. See main text for further details. 
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Appendix 2.  
Table 1: Rank Sector by Effective Rate Protection 
Sector 
ERPs 
1990 Rank   2002 Rank 
Fishing 99.7 1.0 Fruit and Vegetable 40.5 1 
Forestry 69.6 2.0 Live Stock 1.3 2 
Fruit and Vegetable 43.2 3.0 Forestry -0.2 3 
Other major crops 1.4 4.0 Other major crops -0.5 4 
Live Stock -2.9 5.0 Fishing -1.1 5 
Sugar cane -10.9 6.0 Sugar cane -1.4 6 
Rice -15.1 7.0 Rice -1.6 7 
Cotton -17.5 8.0 Wheat -2.5 8 
Wheat -21.1 9.0 Cotton -2.6 9 
Agriculture 20.9  Agriculture 16.9  
Mining -0.01  Mining 0.01  
Motor Vehicles 302.9 1 Vegetable Oil 468.5 1 
Vegetable Oil 211.0 2 Other manufacturing 129.9 2 
Textile 103.0 3 Motor Vehicles 100.8 3 
Other manufacturing 60.4 4 Textile 45.9 4 
Wood 57.8 5 Refined Petroleum 36.7 5 
Sugar 42.4 6 Leather 33.3 6 
Chemicals 33.0 7 Chemicals 20.0 7 
Cement 26.3 8 other food 17.1 8 
Leather 23.6 9 Sugar -0.5 9 
other food 16.9 10 Wood -0.9 10 
Refined Petroleum 2.6 11 Milled Grain -1.2 11 
Lint Yarn 1.9 12 Lint Yarn -1.9 12 
Milled Grain -51.1 13 Cement -65.0 13 
Manufacturing 46.6  Manufacturing 29.3  
Commerce -1.9 1 Housing -0.1 1 
Housing -4.9 2 Energy -0.2 2 
Private services -13.0 3 Commerce -0.3 3 
Transport and 
Communication 
-14.7 
4 
Private services -0.3 4 
Energy -16.6 5 Transport and Communication -0.5 5 
Public services -16.7 6 Public services -0.8 6 
Construction -32.8 7 Construction -3.7 7 
Services -16.1  Services -0.8  
Total 42.5  Total 27.4  
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Appendix 3. 
 Effective Rate of Protection in Historical Perspectives. 
During twentieth century, the concept of ERP was formally deve-
loped in a well-defined theoretical framework. Since then a large number 
of studies have been published on the subject. These studies can be 
categorized into two groups:  theoretical and empirical, which have been 
discussed briefly in the next two subsections. 
a. Theoretical Development  
The concept of protection is not very old, it goes back to the work 
of Travis in 1952 and Barber and Meads, in 1955 who had discussed 
protection with respect to both tariff on inputs and tariff on outputs. But 
the concept under the theory of Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) is 
formally developed in sixties by Harry G. Johnson, Bela Balassa, Basevi, 
Stephen Guisinger, Stephen Lewis and Max Corden. They stress the 
need of an analytical framework to compute ERP index taking into 
account tariff on both input and output which can be used by policy 
makers for their development strategy.  
Initially, theory of ERP is developed on the basis of following 
assumptions; Production function is separable—output function of  
primary factors and intermediate are separable —linear homogenous—
Leonteif technology between inputs and outputs, elasticity of demand for 
imports and supply of exports are infinite (small country assumption), 
PD =  PW +  T23,  where PD and PW are domestic and world prices, 
respectively, and T is a measure of trade restriction, labour and capital 
are immobile internationally.  
In the literature two definitions24 of ERP are defined as: 
1. The Corden-Anderson-Naya definition: Proportionate increa-
se in value added per unit level of an activity (output) due to 
tariff over free trade value.  
2. Corden-Leith: proportionate change (due to tariff) in price of 
value added.25  
Though ERP based on above mentioned two definitions differs, 
                                                 
23 Assuming there is no other restriction on imports except tariff. 
24 Bhagwati and Srinavasan (1983). 
25 If production function describing output Q as a function of  primary factors and 
intermediate are separable and function combining primary factors is concave and 
homogenous of degree one. Then results for price and quantity are meaningful.    
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but under the assumption that production is separable and fixed 
coefficient technology, both definitions render same results (Corden, 
1966). The proponent of General Equilibrium Theory agrees that if 
changes in coefficient aj are ignored the two definition coincides (Khang, 
1973; Ray, 1973; Jones 1971).26 If production function is not separable, 
ERP index does not represent proportionate change in price of value 
added but still can be used to predict the direction of the change but not 
proportionate change in the quantity of value added. Assuming that 
intermediate inputs are used in fixed coefficients (aij) (Leontief 
technology), no substitution between intermediate inputs and primary 
factors the effective rate of protection of sector i, is measured as follows   
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The formula is derived based on classical open economy model. 
It measures relative difference between value added at domestic prices 
and value added at world prices per unit of free trade value added. The 
weights are calculated from Input output table—intermediate use of 
commodity in production—aij.   
The theory of ERP describes effective protection in several 
alternatives ways. For example: “Corden (1966), Jones (1971), quantify 
effects of ERP on  gross output, Khang (1973) measures the effect of 
Effective protection in terms of real value added, while Bruno (1973) 
discusses the effects of protection in terms of gross output, real value 
added and resource movements [Bhagwati and Srinavasan (1973)]. 
Bhagwati and Srinavasan also point out the impossibility theorem 
proposed by Ramaswami and Bhagwati the relationship between ERP 
and Value added may not be valid in case of more than two commodities, 
production function not separable. However, all the above mentioned 
effects are inter-related under the assumption fixed coefficient techn-
ology and separable production function (see, Figure 1).   
 
                                                 
26 If production function is not separable, ERP index does not represent proportionate 
change in price of value added but can be used to predict the direction of the change 
but not proportionate change in the quantity of value added.    
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Figure 1: ERP/NRP and changes in Value Added and Output. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is not free of critiques. Jones (1971), Bruno (1973), 
Khang (1973) Bhagwati and Srinavasan (1973) challenge the utility of 
concept. The main difference in ERP developed by Balassa and by 
Corden lies in the treatment of value added of non-traded goods. Fixed 
technology assumption is also criticized. However, in the short run the 
assumption of fixed coefficient (Leontief Technology) is valid while in 
the long run it may not. The assumption of fixed technology is valid as 
far as we believe that there is no substitution between intermediate input 
and VA (Labour and capital).27 Improvement in technology reduces ERP 
because of substitution and scale effect. In Bhagwati and Srinavasan 
(1983), it is documented that in Ramaswami and Srinavasan address 
impossibility theorem to the prediction of gross output and primary 
factor movement in the absence of assumption that production function 
is separable and in presence of more than two commodities. The 
treatment of non-competitive imports where tariff on these import is for 
revenue generation purposes is also a controversial issue. The difficulties 
                                                 
27 Assuming capital is an imported good but not used as intermediate good. It is 
investment good and fixed in I-O table for that particular year.   
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in calculating ERP on the basis of group of commodities are also 
associated with computation of prices associated with group of 
commodities.  The data on price are not available by commodity groups. 
Instead actual price difference we take nominal tariff as a measure of 
price differential. In addition, depreciation, tariff exempted imports, 
domestic sale and foreign sale (quality difference), separability 
assumption aggregation schemes are the issues which are largely debated 
in the literature. However, Bhagwati and Srinavasan (1973) pointed out 
that under the assumption that production function is separable, and fixed 
technology prevails, ERP theory work in a similar way as the theory of 
nominal tariff work (see, Figure 1). ERP is a weighted average of 
proportionate increase in prices of input and outputs. Weighted average 
of the change in the quantities of value added is predicted by ERP.  Ethier 
(1977), points out that ERP is general equilibrium Phenomen, it should 
be calculated in general equilibrium frame work instead of partial 
Equilibrium.  
ERP calculated on the basis of I-O table has an advantage over 
EPR calculated in partial equilibrium frame work. They are unbiased 
outcome of net economic impact of nominal tariff on productive sectors 
(Diakantoni and Hubert, 2012). It is also a good indicator of transfer of 
income from one sector to other sector of the economy.  The fixed 
coefficient assumption valid in short run. In the long run, substitution 
and scale effects reduce effectiveness of ERPs but do not eliminate.  
Antonia and Hubert (2012) have pointed out that I-O table is construc-
ted for a point in time for a normal year. It is an outcome of resources 
and technology which do not change within a given year as they are end 
result of all substitutions effects due to changes in   price and tariff 
structure. Thus majority of studies have used I-O table because of its 
simplicity and accuracy. They are synthetic and unbiased outcome of net 
economic impact of nominal tariff on the productive sectors.28 These 
estimates are widely used by policy makers in investment planning. 
Therefore, we us I-O table in this study. 
                                                 
28 However with the development computer soft wares to solve CGE, it is commonly 
practice to use CGE model to measure all micro and micro effects of Tariff on inputs 
and outputs, which takes into account both scale effect and substitution effect. 
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Antimiani (2004) documents two methods introduced by Corden 
and Anderson –DERP and OERP. Corden compute Distributive Effecti-
ve Rates of Protection to find a uniform tariff on all goods produced by 
distorted sectors that is equivalent to that of initial tariff structure. While 
Anderson define OERP as the uniform tariff which has impact on profit 
similar to the impact of initial tariff structure. Anderson found that both 
methods provide same results. However, the methods are sensitive to 
underlying assumptions Antimiani (2004) drops small country assump-
tion and found difference in the results.  
With the development of computer software, CGE model are 
commonly used for trade policy analysis. In general equilibrium model, 
price of value added serve as effective protection which predict change 
in real value added in different sectors of the economy. From perspective 
of national accounts, value added is traded so it is ERP, not tariff, which 
measure trade distortions. High ERP indicate anti export bias as the cost 
of the value added of a sector is greater than the international cost 
producing same quantity of VA.  
Review of Empirical Studies 
Despite all the difficulties mentioned in theoretical review, a 
large number of researchers as well as PhD student from all over the 
world conducted research focusing on this area because of its simplicity 
in computation and it provision of solutions to complex economic 
problems. In this section, we review some of these empirical studies with 
a focus on results related to ERPs. 
Diakantoni and Hubert (2012) compute ERP and correlation 
between ERP/NRP and intermediate inputs for 10 countries (both 
developed and developing) for two years 1995 and 2005. They believe 
that in presence of the recent bilateral and multilateral agreement, tariff 
schedule in one country also effect tariff schedule in other country. They 
use Global I-O table of 64 sectors. The results show that NRP and ERP 
have declined between 1995 and 2005 in all countries in all sectors of 
the economy-agriculture, manufacturing, raw material. The negative 
protection over the period of ten years has increased in both developed 
and developing countries. Present study show that in Pakistan share of 
sectors facing negative protection has also increased between 1990 and 
2005 (see, Table 6 in main Text of the paper). The results show 
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technological progress and change in domestic and external demand are 
main drivers of change in ERP, tariff schedule and change in structure 
of production in all countries. Agriculture benefited more from higher 
decline in applied tariff on inputs than that of on output. Reverse is true 
for manufacturing sectors, which reap the benefits. In the long run 
change in technology effects substitution and scale work in opposite 
direction and reduce effectiveness of ERP.  Positive ERP leads to anti 
export bias. The results show that ERP is also a good indicator of transfer 
of income from one sector to the other sector of the economy. In 
agriculture, ERP< NP for majority of developing countries and relatively 
higher decline in ERP is in developing countries i.e.’ Asia. Correlation 
coefficients between ERP/NRP and intermediate inputs29, reveals that 
high nominal protection negatively affects ERP for agriculture and raw 
material (primary sectors) and positively to manufacturing sectors. In 
addition to change in tariff schedule (main director), technological 
progress and changes in domestic and external demands are expected to 
change the structure of protection. The study concludes that ERP are 
more important than NRP as they take into account connectivity with 
both: domestic sectors and foreign sectors. The results also show that for 
a given tariff schedule, higher the share of intermediate inputs, the lower 
will be the absolute protection30 and rate of value added.31Net impact 
depends on the relative strength of the two forces. 
KDA (1967), compute ERP for sectors producing physical goods 
for Korea. The results show that the range of protection rate is broad, 
highest NRP is on cigarette and tobacco, while 14 sectors are with tariff 
> = 100 % and 135 sectors are with tariff between 25 and 100. The study 
finds EPR a better tool to measure interaction between tariff structure 
and rest of the economy compared to nominal tariff.  
  Balassa and Daniel (1968) have explored the relationship bet-
ween comparative advantage and rate of effective protection.  The results 
show that after adjusting for excess profit and monopoly power of labour 
union, the ranking of industry based by ERP indicate their comparative 
                                                 
29 The share of intermediate inputs  (strength of backward linkages) 
30 => lower the value of numerator = ti(1-∑ aij). 
31 Denominator (1-∑ aij). 
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advantage. Study concludes that ERPs have priority to determine the 
industrial desirability/profitability over cost of foreign exchange.   
Topalova and Amit (2011) measure the effects of change in tariff 
on productivity using firm level panel data for India. The results show 
that tariff reduction significantly increases productivity of import 
competing industries. The effect of reduction in tariff on inputs is larger 
than that of reduction in output tariff —six times higher in presence of 
uniform policies for all sectors. The results also indicate that improve-
ment in productivity is resulted from input channel—improve quality 
and exposure to modern technology through imported input.  
Antimiani (2004) compute ERP for four regions USA, EU, 
Mercosur and North Africa based on two definitions: DERP and OERP 
proposed by Corden (1971) and Anderson (1998), respectively. He 
conducts three simulations with same classification for sectors, factors 
and actors using GTAP model.  The comparison of values obtained based 
on DERP and OERP shows that ERP differs with the change of the 
methodology, and assumption. They are not correlated with each other. 
Ranking of the industries also change. Contrary to the results obtained 
by Anderson (1998) who found high correlation between the two for 
agriculture sector of US Economy. However the difference in results of 
the studies may originate from underlying assumption and difference in 
analytical frame work. Anderson use small country assumption and 
compute ERP in partial equilibrium frame work. While Antimiani (2004) 
drops small country assumption and use GTAP frame work.  
Effective Rates of Protection for Pakistan in Historical Perspective 
This part represents review of the studies contributed to the 
literature on ERP for Pakistan.  
Soligo and Stern (1965), as far as we know, was the first study 
conducted in the area of effective protection for Pakistan. They calcu-
lated ERP for the year 1963-64 for 48 manufacturing industries using I-
O table along with other sources of data. The results show that ERP was 
very high in sixties. They conclude that ERPs are high due to failure of 
the domestic industry to use wastes and scrap.  ERP are low due to higher 
relative cost of non-traded inputs such as electricity and transportation 
are responsible. While Dorosh (1990) states that these estimates 
overstate the actual level of protection for the industries where tariff were 
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redundant and under state where other import restrictions are also 
binding constrains such as quota, licensing requirement etc. However 
these reasons may vary by sectors, which were need to be explored 
further. 
  Lewis and Guisinger (1968) compute ERP for 3 groups of 
commodities; consumer, capital, and intermediate using I-O Table. They 
incorporate not only tariff but also taxes, subsidies, quota, redundant 
tariff, and multiple exchange rates. They pointed out that NP can be used 
as a guide for ERP. In presence of non-traded goods, low protection to 
inputs and low value added ratio, NRP understate the actual protection 
to high tariff industry. Industries with high NRP can have low ERP due 
to high NRP on inputs. ERP are sensitive to adjustment to non-tradable 
input which reduce EPR for all industries. Protection to low tariff 
industries changes the ranking of the industries when direct price 
comparison is used due to quota restrictions (on intermediate and capital 
goods). However, after all adjustment, domestic price remains higher 
than international prices. They pointed out discrimination in Pakistan 
against agriculture. Agriculture pay/receive 57/36 percent more/less 
when sell/buy a good to/from an industry. The main conclusion is that 
government should maintain prices to make correct investment 
decisions.   
Following Lewis and Guisinger, two studies, Kemal (1987) using 
secondary data for 10 industries in Punjab from –census of 
manufacturing industries (CMI) and  Kemal, et al. (1994) using primary 
survey data collected by PIDE, were conducted  during the last quarter 
of twentieth century at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.  
Here we briefly discuss the results of Kemal, et al. (1994). They 
calculated ERPs using a micro level primary data for 961 firms for 70 
industries for the year 1992-93 from all provinces of Pakistan.  They 
employ three methods to compute ERPs using actual prices.32 The results 
show 11 industries have negative protection and 39 industries enjoy high 
protection. At the provincial level, Balochistan enjoys the highest 
protection and Sindh the least. The results show that import competing 
industries are more efficient. But the results change with the change of 
                                                 
32 For detail see Kemal, et al. (1994). 
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aggregation scheme, i.e., exclusion of cigarette from the analysis show 
that export oriented industries are most efficient [Dorosh (1990)].    
Din et al (2007) compute ERP for 39 manufacturing industries 
using data from I-O table for 2001 for Pakistan and Corden’s analytical 
frame work. The results show that 18 industries enjoy protection above 
average level –27.8 percent. They recommend to reduce ERP to the 
range of 5 to 10 percent in 3-5 years through price reform accompanied 
by policies to boost investment, competitive exchange rate and improve 
technology.  
From the above mentioned theoretical and empirical review, we 
summarize a number of dimensions, which still need to be explored to 
formulate an optimal policy for Pakistan. 
1. A more disaggregated analysis as aggregation change the results 
significantly if commodities are aggregated in such a way that 
contains extreme values.   
2. To determine Pakistan’s position in comparative advantage 
ranking, there is a need to analyze protection across the countries 
(with same/different trade policies).  
3. Contribution of change in nominal protection, change in 
technology, and change in structure of production to total change 
in ERP. 
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